The Forensic Confirmation Bias:A Comparison Between Experts and Novices by van den Eeden, Claire A.J. et al.
VU Research Portal
The Forensic Confirmation Bias
van den Eeden, Claire A.J.; de Poot, Christianne J.; van Koppen, Peter J.
published in
Journal of Forensic Sciences
2019
DOI (link to publisher)
10.1111/1556-4029.13817
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
document license
Article 25fa Dutch Copyright Act
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
van den Eeden, C. A. J., de Poot, C. J., & van Koppen, P. J. (2019). The Forensic Confirmation Bias: A
Comparison Between Experts and Novices. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 64(1), 120-126.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1556-4029.13817
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl




Claire A. J. van den Eeden,1,2 M.Sc.; Christianne J. de Poot,1,2,3 Ph.D.; and Peter J. van Koppen,2 Ph.D.
The Forensic Confirmation Bias: A
Comparison Between Experts and Novices
ABSTRACT: A large body of research has described the influence of context information on forensic decision-making. In this study, we
examined the effect of context information on the search for and selection of traces by students (N = 36) and crime scene investigators
(N = 58). Participants investigated an ambiguous mock crime scene and received prior information indicating suicide, a violent death or no
information. Participants described their impression of the scene and wrote down which traces they wanted to secure. Results showed that con-
text information impacted first impression of the scene and crime scene behavior, namely number of traces secured. Participants in the murder
condition secured most traces. Furthermore, the students secured more crime-related traces. Students were more confident in their first impres-
sion. This study does not indicate that experts outperform novices. We therefore argue for proper training on cognitive processes as an integral
part of all forensic education.
KEYWORDS: forensic science, crime scene investigation, expectancy effects, contextual bias, decision-making, expertise
It is impossible to secure every item and trace at a crime
scene. Therefore, crime scene investigators have to make deci-
sions about the relevance of the available physical evidence on
the spot. These decisions can be based both on the impression
of the crime scene itself and on contextual information that is
provided, such as investigative leads or witness statements.
Hence, contextual information is likely to influence behavior of
investigators at the crime scene. The influence of expectancy
effects and contextual bias on decision-making has been
described in a broad range of forensic disciplines, see (1), for an
overview.
In recent years, there has been increased attention for cogni-
tive bias in the forensic science community worldwide (2–4).
Also, an increasing body of research focuses on the influence of
bias on forensic comparisons in laboratories (5–7). Despite the
efforts of various forensic sciences institutes and governments to
create awareness of bias, a recent study (8) demonstrates that
forensic experts consider bias as something that mainly concerns
others, not themselves. Therefore, more research on the influence
of the forensic confirmation bias is on the field of practice is
necessary. In a previous study, we explored the influence of con-
textual information on the interpretation of a crime scene.
Results demonstrated that experienced crime scene investigators
can also be prone to bias and that prior information can help
with the interpretation of the scene when it is correct, but can
cause the crime scene to be interpreted wrongfully when it is
incorrect (9).
Expertise
Crime scene investigation is a highly specialized domain,
and it is generally considered that the more years of experi-
ence in the field a crime scene investigator has, the more of
an expert he or she is. Ericsson (10) defines expertise as a
characteristic that is linked to knowledge, skills, and tech-
niques, distinguishing experts from novices within a particular
discipline. A range of studies has shown that experts and
novices think and solve problems in different ways. Some-
times it means that experts outperform novices, but sometimes
they do not (see [11] for an overview). Experts outperform
novices in domains such as generating the best solution to a
problem (12), detection and recognition of patterns (13,14)
and choosing appropriate strategies for problem solving (15).
Also, experts can retrieve domain relevant knowledge with
minimal cognitive effort (16). World knowledge and informa-
tion from previous experiences can be used to interpret new
situations. The schemas that experts have can effectively guide
attention to areas or aspects that are thought to be relevant
based on previous experiences (17). On the other hand, what
is perceived may be incorrectly interpreted in a way consistent
with the pre-existing schema (18).
There are also other ways in which experts fall short com-
pared to novices. For instance, expertise is domain limited and
within their domain of expertise, experts rely on contextual
cues and base-rate information that can help to develop
hypotheses about what has happened. That can also bias their
decisions as it may make them less open-minded toward alter-
native, less likely, scenarios (19,20). Experts can be overly
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confident in their skills (21), and although experts outperform
novices in understanding the deep structure of a problem, they
sometimes overlook details (22).
Forensic Experts
One of the core aspects of the expertise of the crime scene
investigator lies in the ability to recognize places that could con-
tain physical evidence (23). The more experienced a crime scene
investigator is, the more schemas he or she has to draw on. That
in turn may impact the way a crime scene is assessed and may
increase the chances of finding traces (18,24). Previous studies
have demonstrated that forensic experts make sense of evidence
by reconstructing the actions that may have led to the image pro-
duced. As a consequence, experts tend to recover more forensic
evidence (25). Baber and Butler (26) conducted an experiment
on search strategies of expert and novice crime scene investiga-
tors in simulated burglary crime scenes. They found that experts
and novices perceive a crime scene slightly different. Both
experts and novices reconstructed events by the modus operandi
of the criminal to make sense of the scene. Novices, however,
explored the scene in terms of the individual objects that were
present in the crime scene, whereas experts considered objects
with “evidential value.” The evidential value is the evidence
analysis that could be performed as a consequence of the exami-
nation, thus keeping the bigger picture of the criminal investiga-
tion in mind.
Dror (27) proposed the hierarchy of expert performance
(HEP) framework as an overall single framework that coherently
explicates the different aspects of human expert performance,
including forensic experts. The framework consists of two main
components: biasability and reliability. It is argued that an
important component of expert performance across domains
relates to biasability. Biasability is explained as the ability to
make decisions based on relevant information without being
biased by irrelevant information. Although it is desirable that
experts can resist the biasing influence from contextual informa-
tion and are better at doing so than novices, it has not yet been
systematically investigated whether this is actually the case.
Present Study
The main question in the present study is whether experienced
crime scene investigators behave differently compared to novices
when investigating an ambiguous crime scene. In a previous
study, we looked at the influence of prior information on the
interpretation of the crime scene see (9). In the present study,
we expand on our previous work and mainly focus on the search
for and selection of forensic traces.
As we found no general measure or scale to define an expert
(10,27) we defined experts in the present study as crime scene
investigators who have experience in the field. In the Nether-
lands, experienced crime scene investigators are trained at the
Dutch Police Academy. Knowledge on cognitive mechanisms
and biases was not part of this training. Generally, experienced
crime scene investigators have no or only limited knowledge of
cognitive bias in forensic science. Novices were bachelor stu-
dents in forensic science at a university of applied sciences that
were at the end of their 4-year education. Those students could
potentially become crime scene investigators, but are also trained
in, for instance, laboratory work. The students had recently had
their final theoretical courses on cognitive mechanisms and
biases, but lacked practical experience in the field.
We expected that the novices would be less influenced by the
contextual information compared to the experts when interpret-
ing the crime scene as a whole, as they recently had training on
cognitive biases. We expected that the novices would collect
more traces compared to the experts as they explore the scene
based on all objects present, whereas experts may explore the
scene only based on objects with high evidential value. We fur-
thermore expected that the experts would be better at searching
for and finding crime-related traces compared to the novices, as
their experience and skill to keep the bigger picture of the scene
in mind may help them identify traces.
Method
Participants
The data of 58 experienced Dutch crime scene investigators
and 36 fourth year students in applied forensic science were ana-
lyzed in the present study. Parts of the data originating from the
crime scene investigators were previously described in (9), and
the dataset of that study was compared with new data that was
collected from the students in applied forensic science. The
crime scene investigators were recruited among six of ten differ-
ent police regions in the Netherlands, and their ages ranged from
27 to 63 years (M = 44.8, SD = 8.9). Their experience with the
investigation of crime scenes ranged from 2 to 39 years
(M = 10.1, SD = 7.6). Of the experienced crime scene investiga-
tors, 15 (26%) were female and 43 (74%) were male. The col-
lege students in applied forensic science participated as a part of
a course in the final year of the 4-year applied forensic science
program. They had not worked yet as crime scene investigators.
Their ages ranged from 20 to 28 (M = 22.37, SD = 2.13). Of
the students, 20 (56%) were female and 16 (44%) were male.
Design
The experiment consisted of a 2 (student vs expert) 9 3 (type
of prior information) independent groups design. There were
three different types of prior information. One group of partici-
pants received prior information that indicated that the victim
committed suicide, another group received prior information that
indicated that the victim was murdered, and the third group of
participants received prior information without any indication on
the cause of death, see also Appendix A for a more detailed
description of the experimental design.
Materials
With help of forensic instructors of the Dutch Police Acad-
emy, a mock crime scene was constructed. In one of the crime
houses that is used for training purposes for crime scene investi-
gators, a female mannequin was hung in the stairwell. The crime
scene was constructed to be ambiguous. There was evidence pre-
sent for both suicide and murder, but in this case, we con-
structed a crime scene of a murder that the perpetrator staged as
a suicide; see also (9). There were several crime-related traces
present in the mock crime scene, such as blood on a fallen chair
underneath the victim, blood on a door handle, and foreign hairs
on the victim, which could help the participants with the inter-
pretation of the scene (see Appendix B).
Participants in the suicide condition received information
that the death was considered a supposed suicide due to a
known history of depression. Participants in the murder
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condition received information that the death was considered a
supposed murder, due to previous accounts of domestic vio-
lence. Participants in the control condition only received infor-
mation that the victim was found hanging and that there were
no witnesses (see Appendix A for a detailed description of
the contextual information).
The influence of prior information was measured at their ini-
tial assessment of the scene (first impression), during the investi-
gation (traces they wanted to secure) and when participants were
finished with the investigation (most likely scenario).
The ground floor of the crime house was recorded with a
panoramic camera. The areas of the house that participants
could investigate were the kitchen, the dining area, the living
area, the staircase, and the hallway. The 360-degree images
allowed participants to investigate the crime scene in a more
dynamic way than with static pictures and allowed them to get
a good overview of the scene. Detailed photographs of the
crime scene were inserted into the panoramic scene, making it
possible to detect small forensic traces. We wanted to encour-
age participants to actively reconstruct events at the scene and
think about where crime-related traces could be found. There-
fore, numerous detailed photographs with both crime-related
and non crime-related items were inserted in the panoramic
scene (9).
Procedure
The procedure that was followed was the same as described
in (9). Corresponding with the instructions that were provided
to the crime scene investigators in (9), students were first
asked to read the case information that differed according to
the condition. Then, they were provided with a set of four
static photographs of the crime scene to get an overview of
the situation. Subsequently, they wrote down a first impression
of what had happened at the scene and rated confidence in
that impression on a nine-point scale ranging from very uncer-
tain to very certain. The static photographs were provided to
the participants to enable them to get a general overview of
the situation and to formulate a first impression before present-
ing them with detailed visual information about the crime
scene.
Participants were all instructed on how to navigate through
the panoramic photograph. After reading the instruction, partici-
pants were asked to sit in front of the computer and assess the
ambiguous mock crime scene in the 360-degree panoramic pho-
tograph. They were told to reconstruct what had happened and
to secure all crime-related traces. There was a 30-min time limit
for the assessment of the virtual scene.
When the investigation was finished, participants were asked
to write down which traces they wanted to secure and why.
Every item or trace that they considered relevant could be writ-
ten down, and there was no limit to the number of traces they
could include. After carefully assessing the scene, participants
again had to write down again what their impression of the
crime scene was. If multiple answers were given, an additional
question verified which of the options was most likely. Partici-
pants were also again asked to rate on a nine-point scale ranging
from (1) very uncertain to (9) very certain how certain they were
of their judgment of the most likely event. Lastly, some addi-
tional questions were asked addressing motivation, perceived
time pressure, and confidence in finding the crime-related traces,




To assess whether there were other factors that could explain
the differences between the experts and novices, we first per-
formed some independent samples t-tests. Results indicated no
significant effect of expertise on motivation to make a proper
reconstruction of the event t(90) = 1.61, p = 0.11, perceived
time pressure t(92) = 0.01, p = 0.99 or confidence in seeing
the important traces t(92) = 0.08, p = 0.94.
First Impression of the Scene
The majority of both experienced crime scene investigators
and students in all conditions wrote down suicide as the most
likely scenario when we asked them to give their first impression
after seeing the four photographs (see Fig. 1). In the student
group, four participants in the murder condition and one in the
neutral condition wrote down murder as a first impression. In
the crime scene investigator group, only one participant in the
murder condition wrote down murder as a first impression.
To gain more insight in the data, we created a new variable in
which we combined context and expertise and included that vari-
able in crosstabs with first impression. To test for overall signifi-
cance, a chi-square test was performed (v2(10) = 27.58,
p = 0.02). Furthermore, the counts, row percentages, and
adjusted residuals of all cells were displayed (see Table 1) to
explore the data in more depth. The adjusted residuals indicate
whether the counted numbers in each cell differ significantly
from the expected numbers (28). In some cells, the counted and
expected values did differ significantly. Students in the murder
condition wrote down murder as a first impression significantly
more than expected and suicide as a first impression less than
expected. Crime scene investigators in the murder condition
wrote down indecisive as a first impression significantly more
than expected and suicide significantly less than expected.
Confidence in First Impression
A 2 9 3 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of exper-
tise on confidence in first impression (N = 90), F(1, 84) = 6.47,
p = 0.01, g2 = 0.07. The forensic science students were signifi-
cantly more confident about their first impression (M = 6.28,
SD = 1.63) compared to the crime scene investigators
(M = 5.49, SD = 1.45). Furthermore, there was a significant




























students crime scene invesgators 
FIG. 1––First impression by condition. [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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84) = 6.12, p = 0.003, g2 = 0.13, with participants in the sui-
cide condition being the most confident in their first impression
(M = 6.42, SD = 1.69), then in the control condition (M = 5.90,
SD = 1.42), and lastly in the murder condition (M = 5.10,
SD = 1.30). A Tukey HSD post hoc analysis revealed that there
was a significant difference between the murder and suicide con-
dition on first impression (p =< 0.05). There was no significant
interaction between contextual information and expertise on con-
fidence in first impression F(2, 84) = 0.38, p = 0.68.
Number of Secured Traces
A second 2 9 3 ANOVA showed a significant main effect of
contextual information on the total number of secured traces
(N = 94), F(2, 88) = 4.94, p = 0.01. g2 = 0.10. Overall, partici-
pants in the murder condition secured the most traces on average
(M = 18.12, SD = 5.60), then in the control condition
(M = 15.42, SD = 5.80), and lastly in the suicide condition
(M = 13.65, SD = 4.62). A Tukey HSD post hoc analysis
revealed that there was a significant difference between the mur-
der and suicide condition on number of secured traces
(p =< 0.05).
There was no significant main effect of expertise on the num-
ber of secured traces F(1, 88) = 0.86, p = 0.36 and no signifi-
cant interaction between contextual information and expertise on
the number of secured traces F(2, 88) = 0.16, p = 0.86.
Location of Traces
The virtual crime house was divided into different areas where
participants could find traces. The areas were the hallway, the
kitchen, the living room, and the area around the victim. Partici-
pants could write down anything they saw and wanted to secure;
hence, there was no fixed maximum number of traces per area.
Descriptive analyses showed that in general most traces were
secured in the living room (M = 7.65, SD = 2.78), secondly
around the victim (M = 4.96, SD = 2.34), thirdly in the kitchen
(M = 1.79, SD = 1.66), and lastly in the hallway (M = 0.93,
SD = 1.41). In the introduction of the study, we described that
experts and novices may use different strategies when assessing
a scene. We conducted independent samples t-tests to assess
whether the number of secured traces in specific areas differed
between students and crime scene investigators. The only signifi-
cant difference was found for traces in the living room t
(92) = 2.82, p = 0.01, where students (M = 8.64, SD = 2.39),
secured significantly more traces compared to crime scene inves-
tigators (M = 7.03, SD = 2.85). There were no significant differ-
ences between students and crime scene investigators in the
other areas (p values ranged from 0.15 to 0.43).
Crime-Related Traces
There were several crime-related traces in the mock crime
scene that could help the investigators with the interpretation of
the scene. Those were, for instance, blood on a fallen chair close
to the victim and some hairs around the victim’s neck that were
longer and had a different color than the hair color of the vic-
tim.
Although it was previously shown that there was no signifi-
cant difference between the students and the crime scene investi-
gators with regard to the average number of traces they secured
in general, there was a significant difference for the crime-related
traces t(92) = 2.26, p = 0.001. Students secured more crime-
related traces (M = 12.56, SD = 2.78), compared to the crime
scene investigators (M = 10.29, SD = 3.12).
Furthermore, we assessed whether there were differences
between the students and crime scene investigators as to which
specific crime-related traces they secured. We found significant
differences between students and experienced crime scene inves-
tigators for two crime-related traces, namely blood on the fallen
chair v2(1) = 5.26, p = 0.02, which was more often secured by
the students (36,1%) compared to the crime scene investigators
(15,5%), and the victim itself v2(1) = 7.99, p = 0.01, which was
also more often secured by the students (88.9%) compared to
the crime scene investigators (62.1%).
Most Likely Scenario
After the crime scene was processed, participants gave an
overall assessment of what might have happened. Figure 2
shows that participants in all conditions more often write down
murder as a scenario, compared to the initial assessment of the
scene.
TABLE 1––Background 9 condition 9 first impression.
Condition fi: Suicide fi: Indecisive fi: Murder
Student/Suicide
Count 11 1 0
Row percentage 91.7% 8.3% 0.0%
Adjusted residual 1.5 1.1 1.0
Student/Control
Count 10 1 1
Row percentage 83.3% 8.3% 8.3%
Adjusted Residual 0.8 1.1 0.3
Student/Murder
Count 5 3 4
Row percentage 41.7% 25% 33.3%
Adjusted Residual 2.7* 0.4 4.1*
CSI/Suicide
Count 17 2 0
Row percentage 89.5% 10.5% 0.0%
Adjusted Residual 1.8 1.2 1.3
CSI/Control
Count 15 4 0
Row percentage 78.9% 21.1% 0.0%
Adjusted Residual 0.6 0.1 1.3
CSI/Murder
Count 11 8 1
Row percentage 55.0% 40.0% 5.0%





























students crime scene invesgators 
FIG. 2––Most likely scenario by condition. [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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We used the same procedure with the combined variables as
described previously to run a chi-square test on context and
expertise x most likely scenario. An overall chi-square test did
not show a significant association between context, expertise,
and most likely scenario (v2(10) = 11.04, p = 0.36).
Confidence in Most Likely Scenario
A 2 9 3 ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of
expertise on confidence in most likely scenario (N = 88),
F(1, 82) = 0.78, p = 0.38. No significant main effect of contex-
tual information on confidence in most likely scenario F(2,
82) = 0.44, p = 0.64, and no significant interaction between
contextual information and expertise on confidence in most
likely scenario F(2, 82) = 0.99, p = 0.38.
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to assess whether students
or experienced crime scene investigators were more vulnerable
to the influence of contextual information.
The findings of our study demonstrate that context informa-
tion has an impact on the behavior at the crime scene, regardless
of experience. This study shows that contextual information not
only impacts work in forensic laboratories, such as interpreting
fingerprints and DNA analysis results (e.g., [5,29]), but also
crime scene investigators working at the crime scene. Our study
shows that regardless of experience, context impacted the num-
ber of traces secured, with participants in the murder condition
securing the most traces on average. However, we found no dif-
ferences in the total number of secured traces between the stu-
dents and crime scene investigators. Perhaps, even though
novices explore crime scenes more in terms of objects, similar
objects were of interest to both groups in their crime scenarios,
as previous research also indicated that both experts and novices
reconstruct events by the modus operandi of the criminal to
make sense of the scene (26).
Our study further indicates that students secure more crime-
related traces compared to experienced crime scene investigators.
Also, the students more often secured two important crime-
related traces, namely the blood on the fallen chair and the vic-
tim itself that could help to arrive at the right conclusion. This is
contrary to our expectations and the finding of Baber and Butler
(26) that experts are better at finding crime-related evidence.
Maybe it does help to also explore the scene in terms of all indi-
vidual objects, instead of mainly based on objects that are likely
to contain usable trace evidence and consequently could be used
in court, to increase the chance of finding crime-related traces.
Furthermore, students secured significantly more traces in the
living room. This finding may be in line with the finding by
Baber and Butler (26) who found that novices were more
focused on objects in a scene. In our crime scene, there were
many objects in the living room that could draw the attention
even without having a clear crime scenario.
We also examined whether there was a difference between
experts and novices in how they interpreted the crime scene.
Results showed that there were some differences between the
groups with regard to the interpretation of the crime scene at the
start of the investigation. Students in the murder condition wrote
down murder as a first impression significantly more than
expected and suicide as a first impression less than expected.
Crime scene investigators in the murder condition wrote down
indecisive as a first impression significantly more than expected
and suicide significantly less than expected. In all conditions, the
majority of the participants wrote down suicide as a first impres-
sion. Furthermore, participants in the suicide condition showed
most confidence in their first impression. This confidence may be
explained by the fact that the scene looked quite neat and clean,
but is also possible that all participants considered base-rate infor-
mation about unnatural deaths. The vast majority of unnatural
deaths in the Netherlands are suicide cases, and the annual num-
ber of suicides is ten times higher than the number of murders
(30). That knowledge of base rates may make it difficult to com-
pare the groups and isolate the influence of contextual informa-
tion, especially on first impression without detailed information
of the crime scene itself. The students were more confident about
their first impression compared to the crime scene investigators.
This is in contrast with the literature in which it is stated that
experts can be (overly) confident in their judgments (21).
After the investigation was finished, participants were asked to
write down the most likely scenario. Results indicated no differ-
ences between the conditions. Although there were no differences
between the conditions, results also showed that participants in all
conditions more often wrote down murder as a scenario, compared
to the initial assessment of the scene. Hence, for both experts and
students, processing the scene leads to a different interpretation of
the crime scene. This finding is somewhat contradictory to
research findings on belief perseverance, which state that people
have the tendency to maintain a belief despite opposing evidence
(31). However, our finding that even though participants already
constructed an hypothesis of what might had happened before
they assessed the scene and were still able to incorporate new
information and adjust that hypothesis after collecting evidence
may indicate that crime scene investigators are mentally flexible
enough to keep an open mind to opposing evidence and the accu-
mulation of evidence when assessing the crime scene.
In our introduction, we stated that we expected that the
novices would be less influenced by the contextual information
compared to the experts when interpreting the crime scene as a
whole, as they recently had training on cognitive biases. The
findings do not support this hypothesis. It is important to note
that to date there is no empirical evidence what an effective
training on cognitive bias constitutes. Furthermore, it is impor-
tant to note that awareness of bias is not necessarily a protective
factor against it and that forensic experts consider bias as some-
thing that mainly concerns others, not themselves (8,32). Lastly,
training on cognitive bias should include solutions. Although
several solutions have been proposed for forensic investigations
in the laboratory (33), these methods are difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to implement at the investigation of a crime scene. There-
fore, it is vital to conduct further research in this field.
There are several potential limitations of the present study that
are similar to the ones described in (9). Firstly, the study relied
on a mock crime scene that was presented in a virtual environ-
ment. Several participants, mostly crime scene investigators,
indicated that they missed the “feel” of an actual crime scene.
Although virtual crime scenes have also been used in other stud-
ies to assess crime scene behavior (34), there is to our knowl-
edge no empirical evidence that shows that behavior in a virtual
crime scene generalizes well to that in a real crime scene. How-
ever, there is to date also no evidence for the contrary, namely
that behavior in virtual scenes does not generalize well to that in
a real crime scene. This is something that could be addressed in
the future studies. Secondly, a female mannequin was used, so it
was not possible for the participants to include information that
can be derived from the victim’s body in their assessment of the
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scene. Thirdly, only one crime scene was used to test the possi-
ble influence of prior information. Findings from the present
study can therefore not be generalized to all crime scenes and all
criminal cases.
Students may be more skilled in using a computer compared to
the crime scene investigators, and this may have worked in the
students’ favor when assessing the scene. A further limitation of
the present study could include the small sample size of 58 crime
scene investigators and 36 students, which may limit statistical
power. Although we are aware that the student sample especially
is quite small, it was a specific sample of a class that was at the
end of a 4-year education, making it difficult to recruit more stu-
dents at the time. Also, the computer system we used to present
the participants with the virtual crime scene is no longer available.
Consequently, it is no longer possible to present the virtual crime
scene to a new group of students in exactly the same manner.
Therefore, conducting similar studies in the future is important to
test the robustness of the findings of the present study.
Although the absence of effects we predicted may be
explained by limited statistical power a different take on these
null findings is that potentially the training in cognitive bias stu-
dents received has brought the students up to the same level as
the experts, despite the extensive field experience of the latter
group. In other words, the training methods used could be effec-
tive in helping novices show resistance to potentially confound-
ing contextual details when assessing a crime scene. However,
this is something that should be further investigated in the future
studies. Preferably with a student sample which has a similar
academic level as the crime scene investigators.
A final limitation namely concerns the difference in academic
level between the students and the crime scene investigators.
The students have a somewhat higher academic level and differ-
ent educational background compared to the crime scene investi-
gators. Hence, this difference may be large enough to confound
the findings in the present study. It is therefore important to
replicate the present study with novice crime scene investigators
who are in the same educational program as the experienced
crime scene investigators followed.
Conclusion
Even though the present study was one of the first to investi-
gate the role of expertise in crime scene investigation and there
are limitations to take into account, it is important to note that
some of the findings go against general beliefs. Detectives believe
that professional experience and proper training are the most
important protection against factors that may detrimentally influ-
ence investigations (35). The present study provides no evidence
that professional experts outperform novices. Hence, the findings
in the present study argue for proper training on cognitive pro-
cesses and biases as an integral part of the education of every
crime scene investigator as well as every forensic science student.
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On 25-04-2013, about 15.05 pm, a message was received of a
hanging in a house at Haagweg 2 in Apeldoorn. Ambulance staff
concluded that the victim had died. A neighbor who passed by
every day to keep an eye on things found the victim. There is a
suspicion that the death is a potential crime, because of the situa-
tion encountered and the fact that previous reports of domestic
violence have been received from this address. A witness who
worked in the park in the street all day has stated that at the end
of the morning, he saw a man leaves the house.
Suicide Condition
On 25-04-2013, about 15.05 pm, a message was received of a
hanging in a house at Haagweg 2 in Apeldoorn. Ambulance staff
concluded that the victim had died. A neighbor who passed by
every day to keep an eye on things found the victim. There is a
suspicion that the death is a suicide, because of the situation
encountered and the fact that the victim was known to the gen-
eral practitioner because of depressive symptoms. A witness
who worked in the park in the street all day has stated that he
had not noticed anything particular all day and did not see any-
one leaving the house.
Neutral Condition
On 25-04-2013, about 15.05 pm, a message was received of
a hanging in a house at Haagweg 2 in Apeldoorn. Ambulance
staff concluded that the victim had died. The victim was found
by a neighbor. There were no witnesses in the vicinity of the
house.
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